AI tools: Restrict permissions instead of relying on trust
Changing files or sending messages requires an enabling integration. Unnecessary capabilities magnify mistakes and manipulation.
Editorial review:
Background & source findings
OWASP calls excessive functionality, permissions and autonomy Excessive Agency. An assistant may select connected tools based on manipulated inputs or erroneous output. A protocol such as MCP does not itself authorise disk deletion: implemented functions, credentials and enforcement in the destination system determine the actual possibilities. [1]
Scope & limitations
A tool integration is not automatically a specific vulnerability. Assessment needs the possible operation and the permissions used to execute it. [1]
In plain language
A hypothetical catalog assistant needs to read products. If its account can also change prices and delete orders, the key is larger than the task.
Practical recommendations
We recommend defining required operations per task and removing the rest. Avoid unrestricted production accounts for experiments. Check authorisation in the connected system for each operation. Consequential changes should have a meaningful preview and appropriate approval. Record what was actually executed, even if ordinary answers usually appear reliable.