Image-based disclosure: Why the chat interface needs security review
An image address can carry information, but disclosure requires both embedding the information and making the external request.
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Contexte et sources
OWASP describes an indirect-injection scenario in which an assistant includes an image URL containing conversation data. If an interface requests that address, its contents can reach the destination server. Rendering and network policy therefore matter alongside generated text. Markdown alone does not prove that any request occurred. [1]
Portée et limites
Some interfaces block external content. An image request does not automatically read arbitrary files or other browser information.
En termes simples
A hypothetical letter contains an image address with information written into it. That information leaves only if the address is actually contacted.
Recommandations pratiques
We recommend testing external resources with fictional data while observing real network requests. Document permitted destinations and do not substitute a visual warning for technical restrictions. Include previews, exports and email views: the same model response may be handled differently by different interfaces.